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Abstract
Basic research is mainly performed publicly. Yet in the US public
research ndings were not patentable until 1980, and in other coun-
tries are not yet patentable. Patentability renders public research
more directed, with less potential waste, but it also restricts private
applied research. This paper shows, by means of a multi-stage Schum-
peterian growth model, that in the long run the rst e¤ect is bound
to dominate.
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1 Introduction
After the second world war, universities and public laboratories have always
been the main performers of basic R&D in the United States and in Europe.
The year 1980 marked an important turning point in US patentability re-
quirements with the Bayh-Dole Act , which facilitated universities in patent-
ing innovations1. The incentives for academic researchers in the public sector
to explore potentially protable avenues have since then increased, but at the
cost of more restrictions for applied R&D rms, which previously free rode
on a ow of unprotected fundamental ideas. In this paper we show, by use
of a novel theoretical model, that the rst e¤ect will dominate in the longer
run.
The paper contributes to a still scarce but expanding R&D-driven growth
literature on basic research policy, such as Aghion and Howitt (1996), Gers-
bach et al. (2008, 2010, 2013, and 2015), Howitt (2013), Spinesi (2012 and
2013), Gersbach and Schneider (2015), and Akcigit et al. (2016). However,
unlike these papers, we consider basic research within a creative destruc-
tion Schumpeterian growth model extended to incorporate the distinction
between basic and applied ideas in the product innovation process.2
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the main
model we use to compare the two institutional scenarios. Section 2.1 ap-
plies this new framework to a stylized pre-1980 US scenario: basic research
ndings are conceived in public institutions and put into the public domain,
triggering patent races by freely entering perfectly competitive private R&D
rms aiming at inventing a better quality product. Section 2.2 studies a
stylized Bayh-Dole Act scenario, where basic R&D achievements of public
institutions are patented and, afterwards, developed into tradable applica-
tions by prot maximizing patent holders. In Section 2.3 we prove our main
result. Section 3 concludes with some comments.
1Prior to the Bayh-Dole act, the public co-funding of research - which is now pervasive
in the academia - posed a serious legal problem to the patentability of basic research.
2Unlike Cozzi and Galli (2009 and 2014), which also use a multistage Schumpeterian
approach, we focus on the long-term e¤ects of the patentability of public research results.
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2 The Model
Consider an economy as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), with a contin-
uum of di¤erentiated consumption good sectors ! 2 [0; 1] with corresponding
di¤erentiated R&D sectors. In each sector, a monopolistically competitive
patent holder of the cutting edge quality good produces di¤erentiated con-
sumption goods, by combining skilled and unskilled labour, until replaced by
a better quality product monopolist. Product improvements occur in each
industry in continuous time t. When the state-of-the-art quality product in
an industry ! 2 [0; 1] is jt(!) 2 N , R&D rms compete in order to learn
how to produce the jt(!) + 1st quality product. However, unlike Grossman
and Helpman (1991), we assume that an intermediate basic research idea is
necessary in order to start applied R&D looking for the new product.3 Both
basic and applied research employ only skilled labour. Hence in our frame-
work, basic research can be targeted to a specic industry and it depends on
the existence of an already commercialized innovation in the sector.4
Consequently, at any instant we can partition the set of industries [0; 1]
into two subsets: industries ! 2 A0, with measure mt(A0), still lacking a
useful basic research result needed for applied R&D to start; and industries
! 2 A1, of measure 1  mt(A0), in which a basic idea is present, useful for
applied R&D to complete the next quality product. Let nB(!; t), indicate the
basic research employment of a sector ! 2 A0, and nA(!0; t) applied research
employment in a sector !0 2 A1 at date t.
We assume that researchers Poisson process probability intensity to suc-
ceed in inventing a basic research idea is  > 0, whereas the probabil-
ity of nding the corresponding application is g(nA(!;t))
nA(!;t)
, where g(0) = 0,
g0 > 0 > g00, limx!0 g0(x) = 1, limx!1 g0(x) = 0. These Inada conditions
guarantee, with no loss of generality, an interior solution (see Scotchmer,
2004), and incorporate an intra-sectoral congestion e¤ect in applied R&D,
capturing "stepping on toes" (Jones and Williams, 1998 and 2000).
In symmetric equilibria we can write: nB(!; t)  nB(t) and nA(!; t) 
nA(t). Hence the probability per unit time of the arrival of a basic research
idea at date t in a sector ! 2 A0 is nB(t), while the probability per unit
time of the arrival of a better quality product in a sector ! 2 A1 is g (nA(t)).
3See Cozzi and Galli (2014) for a similar framework, but with private basic research
only.
4This captures Nelsons (2006) idea of R&D as a two-way feedback process, in which
basic researchs theorizing is inspired by applied research results.
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The wage of the unskilled labour is the numeraire, and the skilled labour
wage is w. The aggregate supply of skilled labour is constant and denoted
L > 0.
In our symmetric equilibria, the per-capita mass of skilled labour em-
ployed in each manufacturing sector ! 2 [0; 1] at time t, labeled xt is a
decreasing function of the skilled wage. i.e. xt = x (w(t)), as in the usual
Schumpeterian models5.
As for example Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Cozzi and Galli (2014), we
will assume: x(0) > L, x0 > 0 > x00, limw!0 x0(w) =1, and limw!1 x0(w) =
0.
2.1 Unpatentable Public Research
Let us assume that the public researchers, unguided by the prot motive,
have no incentive in allocating their R&D e¤orts in the m(A0) sectors where
they are needed by the applied R&D rms. Rather, lacking additional moti-
vation, they are distributed over the sector space [0; 1] according to a uniform
distribution. This untargetness is the only non-market ine¢ ciency, directly
stemming from the absence of a prot seeking motive.
We denote LG 2 [0; L] the exogenously given amount of skilled workers
employed in the public basic research institutions, assumed funded by lump
sum taxes on consumers.
Being LG uniformly spread over the product space, it also denotes the
per sector amount of basic research. That is:
nB = LG.
Therefore the probability that in any given sector ! temporarily in A0 a
useful basic idea will appear is LG, whereas the probability that in a sector
! temporarily in A1 an existing intermediate idea generates a new marketable
product is g(nA). Basic research labour researching in a sector ! 2 A1 is
not producing any useful research idea, but a redundant duplication of the
existing one6.
5We borrow the household and the manufacturing set up from Cozzi and Galli (2014),
which we do not repeat to save on redundant space.
6Being costly to nd, this equally useful idea is likely derived in a novel way, and
thereby still e¤ective to enhance the inventors academic CV.
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Let us dene v0L(t) as the stock market value of a monopolistic rm pro-
ducing the top quality product in a sector ! 2 A0, and v1L(t) as the value of
a monopolistic rm producing the top quality product in a sector ! 2 A1.
These two types of quality leaders both earn the same prot ow, (w(t))
non-increasing in skilled wage. In sectors that are currently of type A0 the
applied R&Drms cannot enter because there is no basic idea to be exploited:
they shall wait until the public researchers invent one, causing that sector
to switch into A1. Instead, in an A1 sector applied R&D rms hire skilled
workers in order to complete the freely available basic idea. Since there is free
entry into applied research, the R&D rms expected prots are dissipated.
We drop time indexes from here on and we only focus on the steady state,
in which - after dening r as the relevant steady state interest rate7 - the
following free entry condition and stock market arbitrage equations hold:
w =
g (nA)
nA
v0L (1a)
rv0L = (w)  LG
 
v0L   v1L

(1b)
rv1L = (w)  g (nA) v1L. (1c)
In the stationary distribution the ow of industries entering the A0 group
must equal the ow of industries entering the A1 group. Hence:
(1 m(A0)) g (nA) = m(A0)LG. (2)
The skilled labour market clearing condition8 is:
L = x (w) + nB + (1 m(A0))nA.
Hence in this section we have six independent equations which allow us
to uniquely solve for the six endogenous variables w, nB, nA, v0L, v
1
L, and
m(A0).
2.2 Bayh-Dole Act
Unlike the previous section, we here model a post-Bayh-Dole Act US scenario:
as a basic idea is invented in an A0 sector, it gets protected by a patent with
innite legal life.
7Equal to the subjective rate of time preference in this class of models (see Cozzi and
Galli, 2014).
8Since unskilled labour is only in manufacturing, we do not need to spell it out.
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Let vA, denote the present expected value of a basic idea patent holder,
operating an applied R&D rm in an A1 industry and aiming at becoming
the new quality leader. Such a rm will optimally choose to hire an amount
nA of skilled research labour to maximize the di¤erence between its expected
gains from completing its own basic idea - probability of inventing, g (nA),
times the net gain from inventing the nal product, (v0L   vA) - and the
implied labour cost wnA. Its rst order conditions is:
g0(nA)(v
0
L   vA) = w. (3)
Costless arbitraging between risk free loans and rms equities implies
that at each instant the following arbitrage equations must hold in equilib-
rium:
rvA = g(n

A)(v
0
L   vA)  wnA (4a)
rv0L =    nB
 
v0L   v1L

(4b)
rv1L =    g(nA)v1L (4c)
Notice that now in equation (4b), the partial obsolescence of a monop-
olist in A0 is stronger because LG gets spread over a smaller set of indus-
tries, of measure m(A0). In fact, unlike in the previous section where public
researchers diluted their labour over the entire product space and waisted
(1 m(A0)) of their e¤orts, here basic researchers target their activity only
in the A0 sectors. That is:
nB =
LG
m(A0)
The steady state industrial dynamics of this economy is hence described
by
(1 m(A0)) g (nA) = LG. (5)
Notice that unlike the previous equation (2), in eq. (5) the aggregate ow
of new basic discoveries is m(A0) 
LG
m(A0)
= LG.
The labour market clearing condition is:
L = x (w) +m(A0)nB + (1 m(A0))nA.
Hence we have seven independent equations which allow to uniquely solve
for the seven endogenous variables w, nA, nB, vA, v
0
L, v
1
L, and m(A0).
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2.3 Comparing the two Regimes
Having set up the two economies, we can prove the following:
Proposition 1 The post-Bay-Dole act steady state equilibrium is charac-
terized by more innovations than the steady state equilibrium in which public
research institutions cannot patent basic discoveries.
Proof. In the unpatentable research case, we know from eq. (2) that the
steady state equilibrium innovation rate is m(A0)LG. Since LG > 0, eq.
(2) also implies that m(A0) < 1. In the Bayh-Dole act case, we know from
eq. (5) that the steady state equilibrium innovation rate is LG, which is
higher than m(A0)LG - where m(A0) here comes from the Bayh-Dole act
system of equations. Therefore the statement follows.
Remark. The intuition behind this result is that when basic research
is not wasted in 1   m(A0) redundant research lines more scientic results
will ow into applied R&D. This dilutes applied R&D labour on more in-
dustries, thereby increasing the marginal benet of each industrys applied
R&D. Prot maximizing applied R&D rms will therefore attract enough
labour from the manufacturing sector to complete them. Notice that this
occurs despite restricted entry to applied R&D generated by patent barriers.
3 Final Remarks
We have proved that allowing the patentability of public basic research out-
comes increases the long-run innovation rate of an economy, despite restrict-
ing entry into applied R&D. This result suggests that the 1980s US policy
switch to patentable public research results could have been not only good for
the nances of the public universities and laboratories - now beneting from
patent royalties - but also for innovation and growth. This result could be
useful for discussing a more pro-growth and nancially sustainable research
policy in several countries such as, for example, the European countries,
Canada (Howitt, 2013), and Japan.
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